Why this page exists. A comparison that states facts about a competitor without sourcing them is worthless — to you, to a journalist, to an AI tool that might cite this content. We prefer verifiability over convenience.
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Comparisons with competitors
- hiya.comOfficial Hiya site — how it works, free/Premium pricing. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- us.norton.com & support.norton.comNorton's Scam Protection / AI-Powered Scam Protection pages, Safe Call, Safe SMS and Scam Protection Pro documentation. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- support.google.com — Caller ID & spam protectionOfficial Android documentation on the native call-filtering setting (only one app active at a time). Accessed 31/07/2026.
The Threat Laboratory
- ACMA — "55 million scam calls busted as new code bites"March 2021 release: ~11 million single-ring (wangiri) scam calls blocked out of 55M+ scam calls total under the industry code. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- ACMA — New initiatives to combat SMS scams (March 2025)2.3 billion scam calls and 857.4 million scam SMS blocked by telcos since December 2020 / July 2022 respectively. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Scamwatch — Unexpected missed calls from overseas numbersOfficial ACCC warning describing the wangiri / missed-call scam pattern. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s.474.17Using a carriage service to menace, harass or offend — maximum penalty 5 years' imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $33,000 (300 penalty units). Accessed 31/07/2026.
- eSafety CommissionerOfficial Australian regulator for cyber-abuse and online harassment reporting. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- OAIC — Notifiable Data Breaches statistics, 2025Published 6 July 2026: 1,205 notifications in 2025, a record since the scheme began in 2018 and up 8% on 1,112 in 2024; 716 attributed to malicious or criminal activity. Accessed 23/08/2026.
- OAIC — Notifiable Data Breaches, sector breakdown 2025Health service providers most affected with 225 notifications (19%), ahead of financial services (157) and Australian Government agencies (118). Accessed 23/08/2026.
- OAIC — Australian Community Attitudes to Privacy Survey, 202682% of Australians concerned about data breaches, up from 74% in 2023. Accessed 23/08/2026.
- Origin Energy — customer data incident statements, July 2026First contact from the claimant on 2 July, proof supplied 22 July, public statement 23 July, and confirmation on 28 July that c. 900,000 current and former customers had data accessed. ACSC, AFP and OAIC notified. Accessed 23/08/2026.
- ABC News — Origin Energy data breach coverage, 22 and 28 July 2026Reporting on the disclosure timeline, including that a sample of records shown to journalists could not be independently verified at the time. Accessed 23/08/2026.
- The Threat Lab — VitalAireFrance, claimed 19/09/2026: 50,000 patient records claimed stolen from a French medical extranet (VitalWeb/VitalAire), including French social security numbers. Not confirmed by VitalAire. Sources: Cyberattaque.org, Fuites Infos, Kohen Avocats, FrenchBreaches. Accessed 24/09/2026.
- The Threat Lab — Paris Saint-Joseph HospitalFrance, claimed 19/09/2026: 15,060 patient identities and 738 staff identities claimed stolen, no clinical data involved. Not confirmed by the hospital. Sources: Cyberattaque.org, Fuites Infos, FrenchBreaches. Accessed 24/09/2026.
- The Threat Lab — FBI / ShinyHuntersUnited States, claimed 22/09/2026: ShinyHunters claims the theft of data on roughly 5,000 FBI agents; Reuters corroborated elements for at least 10 real agents, including director Kash Patel. Not confirmed by the FBI, which said it is investigating. Sources: TechCrunch, The Hacker News, Forbes, Nextgov, Digwatch. Accessed 24/09/2026.
- The Threat Lab — Spain, autonomous AI agent attackFirst cyberattack officially confirmed to have been carried out autonomously by an AI agent, confirmed by the AEPD (Spain's data protection authority). Sources: Dark Reading, Briefia, Tech-Connect. Accessed 24/09/2026.
- The Threat Lab — Activa InsuranceAfrica (pan-African insurance broker), claimed 23/09/2026: threat actor "fuie" claims roughly 18,765 rows (identities, contracts, beneficiaries), around 10,758 identifiable people. Not confirmed by Activa Assurances. Single source: FrenchBreaches. Accessed 24/09/2026.
Scam guides
- Scamwatch — ATO and myGov impersonation scamsOfficial ACCC alert; 1,461 ATO impersonation reports logged in March 2026. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- ATO — myGov impersonation warningOfficial Australian Taxation Office notice confirming links have been removed from ATO/myGov SMS. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Australia Post — Scam alertsOfficial Australia Post page on fake delivery/customs-fee texts. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- MailGuard — Australia Post parcel-held scam analysisIndependent security analysis of the fake redelivery-fee campaign. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Cyber Daily — global toll/parking scam wave (Bitdefender research)79,000+ fake Linkt texts across 40 campaigns tracked since December 2025. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Linkt — Latest scams and alertsOfficial Linkt security page confirming links have been removed from its SMS. Accessed 31/07/2026.
Regulation & your rights
- AFCA — Receiving banks and unauthorised account openingsOfficial AFCA notice on its expanded scam-complaint jurisdiction from 12 March 2026. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Lexology — Australia's Scams Prevention FrameworkLegal analysis of the Scams Prevention Framework Act 2025: obligations, timelines, penalties. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) & OAICOfficial Australian privacy law and regulator, cited in our Privacy Policy. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- ACMA — Do Not Call Register & SMS Sender ID RegisterDo Not Call Register Act 2006; mandatory SMS Sender ID Register effective 1 July 2026. Accessed 31/07/2026.
- ACMA — Telecommunications Numbering Plan 2025 (F2025L00409), Schedule 5, made 21/03/2025Australia no longer has a premium-rate range in Egidio. The 1900 range, historically premium rate, was reassigned to Internet-of-Things data-only services by the 2025 plan — so we removed it in August 2026 rather than keep claiming a coverage that no longer matches the law. Accessed 05/08/2026.
Digital Hygiene
- ACSC (Australian Cyber Security Centre) — "Social engineering"cyber.gov.au/threats/types-threats/social-engineering. First published 29 May 2025, last updated 9 April 2026. Quoted on /en-au/digital-hygiene/: "Be aware that malicious actors may seek to access your end-to-end encryption by adding an unauthorised device or re-registering your account. Do not share registration PINs or verification codes for social media or messaging applications, especially with other accounts claiming to be 'support' accounts. Always review new device register notifications." The passage is present in the version updated 9 April 2026; we do not claim it was published during the February–March 2026 campaign itself. Accessed 13/09/2026.
- ACSC (Australian Cyber Security Centre) — "Security tips for social media and messaging services"cyber.gov.au/business-government/protecting-business-leaders/security-tips-for-social-media-and-messaging-services. First published 1 August 2011, last updated 9 April 2026. Quoted on /en-au/digital-hygiene/: "…other incidents have involved malicious actors masquerading as support staff in order to attempt covert social media and messaging account access for espionage purposes", and "Do not share passwords, registration codes or verification codes for social media and messaging accounts, especially with other accounts claiming to belong to vendor support staff." Both passages are in the version updated 9 April 2026. Accessed 13/09/2026.
- WhatsApp Help Centre, Telegram FAQ, Signal Support — linked devices and account locksOfficial vendor documentation used for the step-by-step instructions only (checking and removing linked devices, two-step verification / registration lock): faq.whatsapp.com, telegram.org/faq, support.signal.org. Accessed 13/09/2026.
- Australian press coverage of Senate Estimates testimony, 25 May 2026 — compromise of a federal MP's WhatsApp accountPress-reported testimony, cited on /en-au/digital-hygiene/ as real-world context and explicitly attributed as such. Accounts of the incident (around 6 March 2026; WhatsApp Web blocked on the parliamentary network 9 March 2026) describe a legitimate verification code obtained by deception followed by an unauthorised linked device. This is not an ACSC finding and is not cited as a government source. Accessed 13/09/2026.
- IDCARE — WhatsApp security fact sheet (NGO resource, undated)idcare.org — Australia's national identity and cyber support charity. Covers both variants (never share your 6-digit code; check "Linked Devices"). Listed as a non-government support resource, not as a regulatory or government source; the fact sheet carries no publication date. Accessed 13/09/2026.
For sources covering the app's core functioning, privacy architecture and worldwide statistics (not Australia-specific), see the global sources page.